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R69Corvid Cognition: Something to Crow
About?New research indicates that crows are capable of matching stimuli on the basis
of analogical relations: that is, similarity of size, color and shape. This may be
the first evidence for spontaneous analogical reasoning outside of the primate
order.Current Biology
Figure 1. Suggested control condition.
The sample containing two different shapes of the same color appears on the bottom row. The
comparison stimuli appear on the top with the correct stimulus appearing on the upper right.
All stimuli contain two colors.Jennifer Vonk
Despite decades of research that has
revealed tantalizing evidence for the
presence of relational understanding
in various primate species, some
researchers claim that this capacity
forms a fundamental divide between
humans and all other species [1].
This conclusion— implying that Darwin
was misinformed in his assertion of
continuity between man and beast
[2] — has met with resistance,
subject to the accusation that some
researchers are motivated by the
desire to keep moving the goal posts
so that no other species could ever
challenge perceived human
superiority. Those who support the
idea of cognitive continuity have
pushed back with increasing
demonstrations of even more distantly
related species evidencing abilities
previously deemed unique to humans.
As they report in this issue of Current
Biology, Smirnova et al. [3] have
followed suit with their new claim
that crows are capable of analogical
reasoning; that is, of understanding
that the relationship between two
or more objects is the same as, or
different from, the relationship between
two other objects.
What is important, and often missing
from such claims, is a clear rationale
for why wemight expect to see ability X
in species Y. Crows along with other
corvids have recently provided some
of the most impressive evidence for
advanced cognitive abilities in the
animal kingdom [4]. Such abilities may
be attributed to their social lifestyle, but
one cannot draw such a conclusion
without comparison to other closely
related species with lower levels of
sociality. Such comparisons are largely
lacking in the comparative literature.
What the recent findings do
convincingly demonstrate is that even
species distantly related to humans
may share an ability that is ranked
among the highest in cognitive
complexity and indeed is relatively lateto develop in human ontogeny [5–7],
usually taken as a sign that the ability
may have emerged relatively late in
evolutionary history.
Thus, the claim for evidence of
analogical reasoning in the crow
deserves great scrutiny. In particular,
the finding that crows performed
equally as well on tests of analogical
reasoning as they did on tests of
perceptual similarity matching should
be considered surprising. In fact, such
a finding points to the possibility that
the two subjects were using a simpler
(non-relational) rule to solve both
problems. It is possible that the crows
did not view the stimuli as presenting
two objects that could be related on the
basis of a shared attribute, but instead
viewed the stimuli as a single patternthat contained, for example, one or
two colors. The work of Wright and
colleagues [8,9] on configural stimulus
processing in the pigeon provides
some indirect support for such a
notion. In fact, given that pigeons
have performed exceptionally well on
sameness/difference tasks while apes
have sometimes struggled (personal
observations with chimpanzees and
gorillas), it is possible that the bird
brain, which differs quite significantly
from the primate brain, processes
stimuli in an altogether different
manner.
It is unfortunate that Smirnova et al.
[3] did not manipulate the stimulus
configurations in ways that might have
allowed them to determine the birds’
reliance on features such as orientation
of large and small objects. The authors’
conclusions are fortunately supported
by the finding that birds transferred
from relational trials of different types:
for example, from size manipulations
to color manipulations to shape
manipulations. In each of these types of
task, however, a perceptual rule may
have aided the discrimination process.
For instance, all of the size trials were
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Figure 2. Sample trial configuration.
The sample appears in the bottom with two circles of different colors. The correct comparison
appears in the top left with two squares of different colors (one color is shared with the sam-
ple). The incorrect comparison appears on the top right with two different shapes of the same
color (one color is shared with the sample). (Reproduced with permission from [11].)
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smaller shapewas always to the right of
the larger shape, while the two similarly
sized shapes were aligned vertically
side by side, thus creating a clear
perceptual similarity between the
sample and the correct comparison
that did not necessitate processing
the stimuli as ‘two items that are not
of the same size’. The same color
versus different color comparison
could also be achieved by following
a simple rule labelled the ‘perceptual
processing account’, such as ‘one
color in sample — choose one color
in comparison’; alternatively ‘two
colors in sample — choose two colors
in comparison’.
Although Smirnova et al. [3]
would argue that this account is not
conceptually distinct from their own
interpretation that the birds were
performing a relational judgment
task, the two explanations for the
‘positive’ results rest on attributions
of profoundly different cognitive
capacities. For instance, the relational
interpretation requires that the bird
process the two objects in the sample
stimulus as being two distinct objectsthat may, or may not, share an element,
such as size or color. It rests upon the
ability to reason about analogies — a
capacity typically reserved for human
adolescents and adults [5–7]. The
perceptual processing account, in
contrast, supposes only that the bird
recognizes the presence or absence of
certain perceptual features in the entire
stimulus. It does not necessitate that
the bird compute the presence of two
objects or draw inferences about the
relationship between them; rather,
the bird is required only to choose
the comparison stimulus that best
matches the sample via the presence
of similar physically observable
characteristics.
A useful control condition not
implemented in previous work would
be to include single shapes that were
colored in multi-color patterns such
that the entire stimulus could contain
two colors but still exemplify the ‘same’
relation (see Figure 1), which would
prevent the birds from using the rule
suggested by the perceptual
processing account. A shape condition
could incorporate a larger shape filled
with a pattern containing a smallerand different shape so to
additionally manipulate the number
of different shapes present in the
‘same’ stimuli.
Smirnova et al. [3] did include a
quantity manipulation in the training
of their birds, but they did not test
the birds’ relational understanding
using such a variable. This is a pity,
as requiring the birds to match
samples that contained two arrays of
the same or different quantities might
have negated some of the concerns
with the other experimental
manipulations described above. A
quantity condition could have provided
a more convincing demonstration of
relational matching due to the fact
that different quantities of dots, for
example, can be presented while
manipulating the area and size
of the dots, contrasting perceptual
cues with quantity information [10].
Future experiments should benefit
from careful manipulations of stimulus
configurations as in Wright’s work [8,9]
while examining potential deficits in
performance as a result. In addition,
experiments should manipulate the
number of shared features such that
researchers can compare performance
when correct and incorrect comparison
stimuli share none to several physical
features with the sample. In fact, in
the first study of relational reasoning
to manipulate pairs of same colored
and shaped objects [11] I included
stimuli that sometimes shared one
or two elements with the sample
(see Figure 2) and analysed the data
according to whether the apes in
that study were more likely to choose
stimuli that shared such features.
There were no differences in
performance based on the presence
or absence of shared features.
Although this study, conducted over
a decade ago, in retrospect also
suffers from the same susceptibility
to alternative accounts, the apes had
to discriminate what was shared
between the items in the sample
(either color or shape) and choose the
correct alternative from an incorrect
comparison that included two items
that shared the opposite dimension,
thus making a more compelling case
for attending to a specific relation.
Pepperberg’s [12] innovative work
with Alex, the grey parrot, also allowed
the parrot to indicate what dimension
(color, shape, material) was the same
between different pairs or sets of
objects, rather than simply choosing
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R71a pair of items that matched some
component of the sample.
All of this is not to say that I believe
that crows do not possess relational
knowledge — they very well might. But
it is to say that we must be cautious in
granting abilities to animals that are
interesting largely because they
potentially break down the human
erected divide between humans and
other animals, and less so because
they illuminate some aspect of animal
cognition that explains that particular
animal’s umwelt. It has become
something of a ‘holy grail’ type pursuit
to find evidence for abilities that have
served to enforce this divide, often
times little justified by an interest in how
that species solves problems
presented in their evolutionary history
or current environment. And, if we
cannot conclusively demonstrate the
presence of such traits against all
alternative interpretations — some of
them resting on simpler cognitivemechanisms — then we are
dismantlingMorgan’s canon at the cost
of maintaining theoretical rigor.
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Systemic StressCells respond to elevated temperatures through a well-characterized
heat-shock response that enables short-term survival, long-term adaptation
and mitigation of macromolecular damage. New work reveals a cell
non-autonomous layer of stress-response regulation between neurons and the
gonad involving serotonin.Arjumand Ghazi and Todd Lamitina
Mechanisms that allow cells to sense
and adapt to stress have been studied
for decades. Classic work from the
1960s by the Italian scientist Ferruccio
Ritossa serendipitously led to the
discovery that cells activate a massive
transcriptional response to elevated
temperature, which we now refer to
as the ‘heat-shock response’ [1].
Ultimately, these observations led
to the discovery of the heat shock
proteins (HSPs) and the key protein
that activates HSP expression, the
heat shock transcription factor (HSF).
The study of HSPs and HSF has
transformed our understanding of
basic cell physiology, providing
foundational insights into mechanisms
of gene expression and protein
translation, as well as protein folding
andmisfolding [2]. More recently, HSPsand HSF have emerged as potential
points of intervention for treating awide
range of conditions involving the
accumulation of damaged and
denatured proteins, such as
Alzheimer’s disease, Huntington’s
disease, amyotrophic lateral sclerosis
(ALS) and even the process of normal
aging [3].
After Ritossa’s early work on
the Drosophila heat-shock response,
the field focused on defining the
mechanism of HSF activation. During
this period, the cell was the major
unit of study. What emerged was a
homeostatic model in which HSF
was retained in an inactive state via
interaction with cytosolic chaperones.
Stress induced the bulk misfolding
of cytoplasmic proteins, which then
competed with HSF for binding to
a limited number of chaperones.
With chaperones occupied with therefolding of client proteins, HSF
gained access to the nucleus where
it activated HSP gene expression.
Increased HSP levels reduced the
burden of misfolded proteins in the
cytoplasm and restored the
interaction between HSF and HSPs,
thus closing the feedback loop and
turning off the heat-shock response [4].
While some aspects of this model are
at oddswith experimental observations
(for example, HSF is found
predominantly within the nucleus
before stress [5]), the nature of the
model is nonetheless entirely cellular,
each cell acting on its own to detect
stress-induced protein damage and
restore homeostasis.
However, cells of metazoans do
not exist alone but rather are part of
a complex system that is subject to
various modes of paracrine, endocrine,
and neuronal regulation. How cellular
stress responses are shaped by these
additional layers of regulation remains
largely unknown, but recent studies in
the nematode Caenorhabditis elegans
are beginning to shed light on these
events. Previously, Prahlad, Cornelius
and Morimoto [6] made the surprising
discovery that two sensory neurons,
called the AFD neurons, which enable
thermotactic behavioral responses
to temperature, are also required
